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Illinois suffers from the most partisan system in the nation for electing judges— 
a system that erodes the independence of courts from politics.  
 
Politics, Not Merit, Is the Crux of Selection for Illinois Judges: Judges at every 
court level must declare as a Democrat or Republican when they first run for 
office. This makes it easy for special interest groups, businesses, labor unions, 
trial lawyers, and political parties to donate heavily to judicial candidates. 
Illinois is among the few states with no formal merit process at any point in 
selecting judges. 
 
Elections for Illinois Judges Are Giant Magnets for Out-of-State Campaign 
Contributions: Justice Lloyd Karmeier, a Republican with strong backing from 
big business, and his Democratic opponent spent $9.3 million on a supreme 
court seat for a sparsely populated rural district. Democrats play the money 
game, too. Up for a retention vote, Justice Thomas Kilbride received more than 
$2 million from the state Democratic Party and labor unions. 
 
Illinois’ Partisan Elections Mimic Influence Peddling in Legislative Elections: 
Partisan judicial campaigns produce court rulings that set major public policies 
in Illinois. Behind these decisions, large corporations, powerful labor unions, 
wealthy trial lawyers, and entrenched political parties exploit the state’s 
partisan elections. This study identifies four major Illinois supreme court rulings 
that bear earmarks of campaign influence from big donors.  
																																								 																				
* Professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign’s School of Law and Employ-
ment Relations and a Professor at the Illinois College of Law 
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The General Assembly Overpays Illinois Judges: Since 1983, the General 
Assembly has implemented an opaque process that overpays judges. Illinois’ 
appellate judges rank second in the nation for pay. Supreme Court justices are 
paid $220,873; and intermediate appellate justices are paid $207,882. Trial 
judges in Illinois rank third in the U.S. with pay of $190,758. This pay 
arrangement raises questions about the independence of the judiciary from the 
General Assembly in lawsuits over pension reforms and legislative redistricting.  
 
Some Illinois Judges Game the Election System: Illinois’ system of electing 
judges greases the way for unethical conduct. Judges who are up for retention 
elections have “retired” and filed as “new” candidates in the general election. 
By doing so, they avoid the 60% retention requirement and need only 50% plus 
one vote for a new term. No rule prohibits this subterfuge.  
 
Illinois Lacks an Effective Discipline Board for Judges: Unlike many states, 
Illinois has an outdated code of judicial conduct that fails to address the growing 
influence of money in judicial campaigns. This problem is magnified by Illinois’ 
highly ineffective judicial ethics board. A recent audit reported that the public 
had over 300 unanswered complaints against judges, some alleging misconduct 
and mental incapacity. When the public complains about a judge, the board 
issues discipline in less than one percent of these cases. 
 
Illinois should follow other states by adopting more stringent campaign regu-
lations, patterned after the revised ABA Model Code, for judges and judicial 
candidates. More broadly, Illinois should abolish partisan elections and replace 
them with a non-partisan commission of non-lawyer citizens, lawyers, and 
judges to select and retain judges on merit.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Context for Partisan Elections and Judicial Ethics 
 
The Illinois General Assembly and governor are ridiculed for partisan 
politics—Illinois courts are not seen, however, as part of this problem. But my 
study shows that Illinois courts are similarly mired in legalized influence 
peddling. The state’s partisan elections for judges produce court rulings that 
set major public policies and nullify jury awards of billions of dollars. Leading 
up to these supreme court cases, large campaign donations to justices have left 
footprints of influence from corporations, labor unions, trial lawyers, and 
political parties.  
My study adds to a literature that examines partisan elections for judges.1 
I demonstrate how structural influences impinge on the independence of 
																																								 																				
1 For an insightful essay published a century ago on this matter, see generally Samuel 
Rosenbaum, Election of Judges, or Selection?, 9 ILL. L. REV. 489 (1915). In his piece, 
Rosenbaum establishes that: 
 
The candidates for the bench usually occupy minor places far down on the 
ballot, and are swept into office by the success of their party ticket . . . . 
Furthermore, the final choice is left to a body of voters who, as a class, have 
little conception of the duties and technical requirements of the office, and 
have not the training necessary to a right understanding of them. Yet in every 
state in the Union but thirteen, the entire judiciary, from the Supreme Court 
down to the justices of the peace, are elected by popular vote. 
 
Id. at 489–90. See generally David W. Adamany, The Party Variable in Judges’ Voting: 
Conceptual Notes and a Case Study, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 57 (1969); Kathleen L. Barber, Ohio 
Judicial Elections—Nonpartisan Premises with Partisan Results, 32 OHIO. ST. L. J. 762 (1971); 
Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial Selection 
Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273 (2002); Thomas E. Brennan, 
Nonpartisan Election of Judges: The Michigan Case, 40 SW. L.J. 23 (1986); W. St. John 
Garwood, Democracy and the Popular Election of Judges: An Argument, 16. SW. L.J. 216 (1962); 
Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO. ST. L.J. 44 (2003); Henry R. Glick 
& Craig F. Emmert, Selection Systems and Judicial Characteristics: The Recruitment of State 
Supreme Court Judges, 70 JUDICATURE 228 (1987); Kermit L. Hall, Progressive Reform and the 
Decline of Democratic Accountability: The Popular Election of State Supreme Court Judges, 
1850 –1920, 9 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 345 (1984); Donald W. Jackson & James W. Riddlesperger, 
Jr., Money and Politics in Judicial Elections: The 1988 Election of the Chief Justice of the Texas 
Supreme Court, 74 JUDICATURE 184 (1991); Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Bruce W. Hardy, Will 
Ignorance & Partisan Election of Judges Undermine Public Trust in the Judiciary?, DÆDALUS , 
Fall 2008, at 11; Jared Lyles, The Buying of Justice: Perversion of the Legal System Through 
Interest Groups’ Involvement with the Partisan Election of Judges, 27 L. & PSYCH. REV. 121 
(2003); Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Judging Judicial Elections, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
929 (forthcoming Apr. 2016) (book review).  
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Illinois courts. These courts are shaped by the Democratic and Republican par-
ties and General Assembly. Illinois does not use merit selection for judges. 
Illinois simply labels judges by their political party. The General Assembly 
sets judicial salaries at near-record levels. This pay practice raises additional 
questions about the independence of Illinois courts.  
Illinois judges engage in political campaigning that other states strictly 
prohibit. Meanwhile, Illinois’ outdated Code of Judicial Conduct fails to deal 
with millions of dollars that fuel these elections. In sum, Illinois courts mimic 
the state’s corruption-prone political branches. Its judges are not corrupt, so far 
as the evidence shows—but by campaigning so much like elected politicians, 
some judges exercise influence-tinged power that makes them campaign like 
legislators, and colors their rulings as usurpations of legislative power. 
 
B. Overview of Article 
 
 Section II.A of this article explains how Illinois’ method for selecting 
judges is seriously flawed.2 Elections align judges with political parties, and 
strategically labels them for wealthy donors who influence public policies. 
Constitutional theory from the Federalist Papers also suggests that this method 
fails to attract the brightest and most principled lawyers to the bench.3 On the 
other hand, this system tends to attract judicial candidates who are able to 
campaign like politicians. The result is that this highly partisan process hinders 
the judiciary’s fulfillment of its apolitical role.  
 Section II.B examines how Illinois overpays judges.4 This is worrisome 
because the pay system has been controlled by an obscure board whose 
members are named by the General Assembly.5 The scheme shields lawmakers 
from direct scrutiny because the board’s recommendations become law by 
default if the General Assembly fails within thirty days to reject them.6 Com-
pounding the pay problem, judicial productivity in Illinois is declining.7 
Considered as a whole, the system aligns the monetary interests of overpaid 
judges with their legislative benefactors—and while there is no evidence that 
the pay process compromises judicial integrity, it deprives taxpayers of 
accountability and transparency.  
																																								 																				
2 Infra notes 20–39. 
3 Infra notes 30–35. 
4 Infra notes 40–69. 
5 Infra notes 40–41. 
6 Infra notes 42–45. 
7 Infra notes 58–59. 
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Section II.C exposes judicial misconduct related to partisan elections.8 
Some Illinois judges who have barely survived retention elections (contests 
with no opponent) “game” their next election by retiring from office and 
declaring themselves as new candidates in a general election.9 This lowers the 
threshold for winning election from sixty percent to fifty percent plus one vote. 
The retire-to-run ruse conflicts with the intent of the Illinois Constitution, and 
it reveals character flaws in some judges. 
Section III.A explores how partisan judicial elections compromise the 
independence of Illinois courts.10 Multi-million dollar support from business 
groups for a Republican supreme court justice enabled him to vote to reverse 
multi-billion dollar judgments against State Farm Insurance and Phillip Morris.11 
Likewise, large campaign donations to two Democratic justices by their party, 
as well as by unions and trial lawyers, enabled them to vote in major cases to 
broaden tort liability for medical providers.12  
Section III.B explains how the Illinois Judicial Code of Conduct is 
toothless and outdated.13 Illinois waited more than a decade after the American 
Bar Association passed its Model Code of Judicial Conduct before it adopted 
the new rules.14 Even then, Illinois adopted only parts of the Model Code, and 
it avoided stringent standards for political campaigning.15 I compare how other 
states aggressively regulate campaign activities for judicial candidates.16 
Section III.C compares the inactivity in code enforcement in Illinois 
to recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions that deal with similar problems in 
other states.17 In two cases involving partisan elections, the Court has ruled 
that judicial campaigning violated the constitutional rights of citizens.18 In a 
third case involving non-partisan judicial elections, the Court upheld a state 
bar’s sanction of a candidate who wrote a letter to solicit donations.19 When 
these cases are compared to controversial Illinois judicial campaigns, the 
implication is that Illinois judges are not held accountable for compromising 
judicial independence.  
																																								 																				
8 Infra notes 70–90. 
9 Infra notes 76–79, 81–82. 
10 Infra notes 91–109. 
11 Infra notes 94–95, 98–102. 
12 Infra notes 103–07. 
13 Infra notes 110–33. 
14 Infra note 120. 
15 Infra note 131. 
16 Infra notes 132–33. 
17 Infra notes 134–39. 
18 Infra notes 137, 139. 
19 Infra note 138.  
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In Section IV, I offer several recommendations. Illinois should (1) 
abolish partisan elections for judges, (2) update and strengthen its judicial code 
to restrain influence peddling by donors, and (3) increase funding and staffing 
for currently ineffective judicial ethics board. 
 
II. STRUCTURAL INFLUENCES OF POLITICS ON ILLINOIS JUDGES 
 
A. Selection Processes 
 
The Illinois Constitution establishes a supreme court, appellate courts, 
and circuit courts.20 Illinois citizens elect judges.21 Circuit judges serve terms 
of six or four years; appellate judges serve ten-year terms.22 A judge must run 
in a general election, sometimes against an opponent, for a first term. In these 
situations, state law mandates partisan elections at the three levels.23 
Thereafter, judges who run for another term must win at least sixty percent of 
the votes cast in a non-partisan retention election.24 By this time, their party 
affiliation is known to groups that donate heavily in these elections. 
These selection methods are the result of a statewide vote for a new 
constitution in 1970. The Illinois State Bar Association and the Chicago Bar 
Association advocated merit selection of judges and put this idea on the 
ballot.25 Voters favored Proposition 2A, providing for partisan election of 
judges, thus defeating merit selection in Proposition 2B.26 
This vote kept Illinois in a tiny minority of states that run judicial 
elections like elections for legislators and executive branch officers. Only eight 
states have partisan elections for their court of last resort.27 In addition, Illinois 
																																								 																				
20 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1.  
21 See id. § 12(a) (“Supreme, Appellate and Circuit Judges shall be nominated at primary 
elections or by petition.”).  
22 Id. § 10; see also About the Courts in Illinois, ILLINOIS COURTS, http://www.illinoiscou 
rts.gov/General/CourtsInIL.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2017) (“Circuit Judges are elected for a 
term of six years; Associate Judges are appointed . . . for a four-year term.”). 
23 46 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7(1) (West 2010).  
24 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12. 
25 History of Reform Efforts: Illinois, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.judi 
cialselection.us/judicial_selection/reform_efforts/failed_reform_efforts.cfm?state=IL (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2016) (establishing that the Illinois State Bar Association and the Chicago 
Bar Association worked for two decades to put merit selection on the ballot leading up to the 
1970 referendum and that, even after the merit option was voted down, these groups 
continued to advocate for this selection method). 
26 Id. (confirming that Proposition 2A prevailed by 146,000 votes).  
27 Bill Raftery, 8 States Continue to Have Partisan Elections for Their Top Courts; A Look 
at Legislative Efforts to Move to Nonpartisan, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Mar. 9, 2015), http://gavelto 
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is among only thirteen states with no merit commission for judges, and only 
eleven states with partisan election of general jurisdiction judges.28  
Why is this a problem? To begin, when donors and voters see a political 
label next to a judge’s name, this signals that the candidate shares the party’s 
values. Thus, a judge is forever identified as Republican or Democratic even 
when these labels are not used in a retention election. Campaign donors—
especially business groups, labor unions, trial lawyers, and political parties—
are able to make calculated decisions about investing in judicial candidates.29 
The fact that these donors give millions of dollars to high-level candidates 
signifies their confidence that party affiliation reliably predicts a judge’s key 
votes in future cases. 
																																								 																				
gavel.us/2015/03/09/8-states-continue-to-have-partisan-elections-for-their-top-courts-a-look-
at-legislative-efforts-to-move-to-nonpartisan/. In addition to Illinois, the other states that hold 
partisan elections for judges are Alabama, Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, and Texas. Id. However, three of these states have one or more non-partisan methods 
for nominating or selecting justices, thus diluting the influence of partisan politics. In New 
Mexico, a judicial nominating commission provides the governor with recommended candi-
dates to fill vacancies; and political parties are allowed to run candidates against the merit-
appointed candidate in primary elections. Id. In Ohio, candidates first run in partisan primaries, 
but the winners appear on the ballot during the general election without party designations. Id. 
Michigan elects its state supreme court justices in nonpartisan elections, but candidates are 
nominated by political parties at statewide conventions.  
28 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 242850, STATE COURT 
ORGANIZATION (2013), Map 3 at 6 (depicting Illinois among twelve other states with no 
judicial commission), Map 4 at 6 (depicting Illinois among ten other states with partisan 
election of general jurisdiction judges).  
29 See generally BILLY CORRIHER, PARTISAN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE DISTORTING 
INFLUENCE OF CAMPAIGN CASH, CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (2012), https://www.ameri 
canprogress.org/issues/civil-liberties/report/2012/10/25/42895/partisan-judicial-elections-
and-the-distorting-influence-of-campaign-cash/, for a discussion on the increase in judicial 
campaign contributions and overall divisiveness in those states that elect or nominate judicial 
candidates in partisan races. 
 
Why are partisan judicial races so much more expensive than nonpartisan 
contests? One answer could be that potential campaign donors find it easier 
to donate money in these races. In states with partisan judicial elections, 
there is a ready-built infrastructure for “bundling” donations in place, with 
state parties acting as conduits for special interests. 
 
Id. at 2. For a specific illustration, see ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS 
LIST, https://www.elections.il.gov/CampaignDisclosure/ContributionsSearchByAllContribu 
tions.aspx (search with “The Illinois Chamber PAC” as “Last or Only Name” and “10/29/2004” 
as “Received Date”) (reporting on a contribution made by the Illinois Chamber PAC to Justice 
Lloyd A. Karmeier in the amount of $20,000 on October 29, 2004).  
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The nation’s constitutional founders envisioned independence for courts, 
framed in a theory of separation of powers.30 While they saw the judiciary as the 
weakest branch,31 they conferred special legitimacy to courts by conceiving 
them as an intermediate body to protect citizens from the stronger branches.32 
Illinois’ constitution enacts this theoretical foundation by expressly defining 
judicial power as distinct from others.33  
The state’s partisan election system works against this core principle, 
however, by encouraging judges to campaign like everyday politicians. As a 
result, judicial independence is compromised. Judges are open game for politi-
cal factions that compete to control the other branches. Thus, the people lose an 
important constitutional check against a partisan faction that can marginalize 
minority groups. 
Illinois’ method for selecting judges also affects the quality of judging. 
Alexander Hamilton theorized that judges need years to understand prece-
dents on which they base their decisions.34 Judges should have high intellect 
and sound character, an unusual combination; and to attract these people, 
judges should be shielded from political pressure.35 Illinois is heedless to these 
																																								 																				
30 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 401-08 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001) (stating the theory that the judiciary is independent of the political 
branches). “[T]he judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the 
purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no 
active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely 
judgment . . . .” Id. at 402. 
31 Id. (“[L]iberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have every-thing to 
fear from its union with either of the other departments . . . that as, from the natural feebleness of 
the judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its co-
ordinate branches . . . .”). 
32 Id. (“It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate 
body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter 
within the limits assigned to their authority.”).  
33 ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No 
branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.”). 
34 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 30, at 407 (voicing concerns that judges should not 
exercise arbitrary discretion). To counteract this possibility, Hamilton urged that judges 
“should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out 
their duty in every particular case that comes before them . . . .” Id. He understood that “it 
will readily be conceived from the variety of controversies which grow out of the folly and 
wickedness of mankind, that the records of those precedents must unavoidably swell to a 
very considerable bulk, and must demand long and laborious study to acquire a competent 
knowledge of them.” Id.  
35 Hamilton understood that “few men in the society . . . will have sufficient skill in the laws 
to qualify them for the stations of judges.” Id. Furthermore, Hamilton remarked that “making 
the proper deductions for the ordinary depravity of human nature, the number must be still 
smaller of those who unite the requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge.” Id. Finding 
Vol. 2:1]      Open for Business: Illinois Courts and Party Politics 
 
 
193 
concerns. The state runs partisan judicial elections— on the same ballot, at the 
same time, and with the same background issues— as for politicians. Politics, 
not merit, is the crux of selection for Illinois judges. 
Compounding this problem, Illinois differs from most states by failing 
to use commissions to screen candidates for judicial office.36 While maintain-
ing this standard-less system, Illinois has ignored legal experts who advocate 
merit selection.37  
This partisan system allows money to shake hands with Illinois candi-
dates for judicial office. By anchoring judicial office to the Democratic and 
Republican parties, Illinois is the nation’s leading money magnet for out-of-
state campaign donations.38 And ironically, Illinois’ partisan system has led to 
its entrenched supreme court— ironic because elections are meant to give 
voters more influence than merit commissions, and should therefore expose 
candidates to more turnover. If justices fully serve their current terms, they will 
average 19.2 years of unbroken tenure.39 
																																								 																				
judges with high intellect and character would therefore require unusual indepen-dence from 
political influences and long tenure. In particular, Hamilton concluded: 
 
[T]he government can have no great option between fit character; and that a 
temporary duration in office, which would naturally discourage such 
characters from quitting a lucrative line of practice to accept a seat on the 
bench, would have a tendency to throw the administration of justice into 
hands less able, and less well qualified, to conduct it with utility and dignity.  
 
Id.  
36 Methods of Judicial Selection, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY (2015), http://www.judic 
ialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/judicial_nominating_commissions.cfm?state. For 
an example of a screening process that filters out an unfit candidate in another state, see 
generally In re Nocella, 79 A.3d 766 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2013). 
37 NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 25. 
38 REPORT: ILLINOIS HAD HIGHEST SHARE OF OUTSIDE SPENDING IN 2014 STATE SUPREME 
COURT ELECTIONS, PROGRESS ILLINOIS (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.progressillinois.com/posts/ 
content/2015/11/05/report-illinois-had-highest-share-outside-spending-2014-state-supreme-court. 
For a specific illustration, see ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS LIST, 
https://www.elections.il.gov/CampaignDisclosure/ContributionsSearchByAllContributions.aspx 
(search with “Morgan Stanley” as “Last or Only Name” and “10/7/2004” as “Received Date”) 
(reporting on a contribution made by Morgan Stanley to Justice Lloyd A. Karmeier in the amount 
of $25,000 on October 7, 2004). See also SCOTT GREYTAK ET AL., BANKROLLING THE BENCH: 
THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 13 (2015), http://newpoliticsreport.org/app/up 
loads/JAS-NPJE-2013-14.pdf (reporting that Illinois and Tennessee had the most expensive 
retention elections of the 2013–14 campaign season). Illinois state supreme court Justice 
Karmeier’s election was ranked first in the nation for “Non-Candidate Spending Total,” at 
$3,043,620.45, and for percent of “Non-Candidate Spending,” at 90.8%. Id. at 68. 
39 This information was compiled from Meet the Illinois Supreme Court Justices, ILLINOIS 
COURTS, http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/supremecourt/meetsupremecourt.asp, which lists Thomas 
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B. Judicial Salaries and the General Assembly 
 
Illinois’ method for determining pay for judges strips another layer of 
separation from party politics. A 1982 law created a continuous process for 
raising pay for judges.40 The General Assembly formed the Compensation 
Review Board, an obscure public body, to adjust salaries for all state officers, 
including judges.41 This 12-person board is appointed by Speaker of the House, 
House Minority Leader, Senate President, and Senate Minority Leader, 
underscoring the General Assembly’s control over the livelihoods of judges.42 
The board determines pay for public offices and reports its recommendations 
to the General Assembly.43 Because the constitution forbids reduction of 
judicial salaries, the board can only recommend no change or a pay raise.44 The 
law frustrates public airing of judicial pay. Instead, it automatically executes 
the pay recommendation if the General Assembly does not vote to reject it 
within 30 session days.45  
Quinn v. Donnewald challenged this process, arguing that pay raises 
could not be made constitutionally by the inaction of the General Assembly.46 
Justices on the Illinois supreme court— who stood to benefit from this back-
door process— upheld the pay plan.47 The court weakly rationalized the pay 
practice on grounds that fifteen other states set pay similarly.48 More recently, 
																																								 																				
L. Kilbride (Democratic, 2000-2020), Charles E. Freeman (Democratic, 1990-2020), Robert R. 
Thomas (Republican, 2000-2020), Mary Jane Theis (Democratic, 2010-2022), Rita B. Garman 
(Chief Justice) (Republican, 2001-2022), Lloyd A. Karmeier (Republican, 2004-2024), and Anne 
M. Burke (Democratic, 2006-2018) as the current Illinois state supreme court justices. 
40 See 53 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 290/1 (establishing salaries for state officials, including 
judges). The Act increased judicial salaries beginning in 1983, when the state was directed 
to pay the higher amount of the increased rate set forth in the statute or the amount set by the 
Compensation Review Board. Id. This pay salary applied to all judicial offices. 53 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 290/3.1-3.3 (West 2010).  
41 The Compensation Review Act created this Board, and empowered it to evaluate and 
adjust salaries. 63 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/1. 
42 Judicial Salary Tracker, Illinois, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.ncsc.org/ 
microsites/judicial-salaries-data-tool/home/Special-Reports/How-States-Set-Salaries/Illinoi 
s.aspx. 
43 Id.  
44 See ILL. CONST., art. VI, § 14 (forbidding reduction in pay for judges). 
45 63 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/5 (West 2010). If the General Assembly fails to adopt a 
resolution regarding the Board’s in 30 session days, the Board’s recommended salaries take 
effect and the General Assembly is required to appropriate funds to pay those salaries. 63 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/6 (West 2010). 
46 483 N.E.2d 216 (Ill. 1985).  
47 Id. at 223. 
48 Id. at 219. 
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in Jorgensen v. Blagojevich, the Illinois supreme court protected their own pay, 
holding that a governor’s veto of a cost of living adjustment for judges was 
unconstitutional.49  
The annual cost of living adjustment has been repealed since 2009.50 But 
these laws do not necessarily prohibit other ways to increase judicial salaries, nor 
do they abolish the Compensation Review Board. This leaves an unclear picture 
of how judges’ salaries are now set. The National Center for State Courts 
(NCSC) currently says that pay recommendations are set by the board.51 My 
inquiry did not reveal, however, membership on this board, nor was I able to 
verify its existence.52  
This long running pay system shows that the General Assembly and 
Governor fight over who sets pay for judges. NCSC’s current national survey 
of judicial pay shows that the General Assembly has won this battle, leading 
to exceptionally high salaries for their robed colleagues. Pay for Illinois’ 
appellate judges ranks second in the nation.53 The state’s supreme court justices 
are paid $220,873; and intermediate appellate justices are paid $207,882.54 
Trial judges rank third in the nation with pay of $190,758.55 
These lofty salaries are made without regard to judicial productivity. 
From 2004 to 2012, pay for Illinois judges rose 29% due to raises and hiring 
of more judges.56 Meantime, felony caseloads dropped 13%.57 Illinois jud-
ges averaged 4,553 total cases (criminal and civil) in 2009. Busier judges in 
																																								 																				
49 811 N.E.2d 652 (Ill. 2005).  
50 63 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/5.6-5.9, 6.1-6.4 (West 2010).  
51 Judicial Salary Tracker, Illinois, supra note 42. 
52 See Illinois Board, Commission, Task Force and Council List, ILLINOIS.GOV, https:// 
www.illinois.gov/sites/bac/SitePages/AppointmentsListing.aspx (listing all Illinois state 
commissions and boards but failing to reveal the existence of the Illinois Compensation 
Review Board). 
53 For a broader discussion of pay for judges, compare Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & 
Eric A. Posner, Are Judges Overpaid? A Skeptical Response to the Judicial Salary Debate, 
1 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 47 (2009) (finding little evidence that raising salaries improves 
judicial performance) with Jonathan L. Entin, Getting What You Pay For: Judicial Compen-
sation and Judicial Independence, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 25 (2011) (“Protecting judges against 
salary diminution is an important device to ensure their independence.”). 
54 Survey of Judicial Salaries: Ohio Judges Receive Long-Awaited Raise, 40 NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE COURTS 1, 2 (2016), http://www.ncsc.org/FlashMicrosites/JudicialSalaryReview/20 
16/resources/CurrentJudicialSalaries.pdf. 
55 Id.  
56 Jake Griffin, More Illinois Judges, Required Raises Mean We Pay 29% More in 8 Years, 
DAILY HERALD (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.dailyherald.com/article/20120328/news/703 
289967/.   
57 Id.  
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Wisconsin (6,611 total cases) and Indiana (4,983 total cases) earned about 
$50,000 less.58 The Illinois supreme court also noted declining productivity.59 
The co-mingling of monetary interests of Illinois judges and legislators 
is also suggested by their gold plated pension plans. A recent analysis shows 
that nearly 40 percent of the state’s 789 retired judges make more money in 
pensions than when they sat on the bench.60 The average annual judicial pen-
sion in 2015 was $132,426, about $25,304 more in retirement than they were 
paid in their final salaries.61 Similarly, 104 of 310 former elected state officials 
receive state pensions in amounts higher than their final salaries.62  
In two recent cases, the Illinois supreme court struck down laws that 
tried to repair massively underfunded public pensions.63 Its opinion in In re 
Pension Reform Litigation mentioned that lawmakers excluded the Judges’ 
Retirement System of Illinois from pension cutting legislation.64 This was the 
court’s tacit admission that lawmakers curried favor with judges by protecting 
only judicial pensions. The court’s opinion did not discuss, however, that the 
judicial pension system is distressed and needs cuts, too.65 While this decision 
is legally sound, it also set a powerful precedent for preserving pensions of the 
judges who joined in this ruling. 
Currently, the issue of separation of powers between Illinois courts and 
the General Assembly lurks in a major legal controversy over drawing a map 
for legislative districts. In Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections,66 a Demo-
																																								 																				
58 Id.  
59 The Illinois state supreme court disposed 2,922 cases in 2010. 2014 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
ILLINOIS COURTS, SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS 19 (2014), http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/Sup 
remeCourt/AnnualReport/2014/AdminSumm/2014_Admin_Summary.pdf. This figu-re peaked 
in 2011 at 3,104 cases, before falling to 2,793 cases in 2012, 2,627 cases in 2013, and 2,443 cases 
in 2014. Id. All Illinois courts disposed 634,833 cases in 2010. Id. at 33. Thereafter, case 
dispositions fell to 591,474 in 2011, 576,071 in 2012, 555,648 in 2013, and 504,230 in 2014. Id.  
60 Jake Griffin, 40% of Ex-Judges’ Pensions Higher than Old Salaries, DAILY HERALD (Dec. 
2, 2015), http://www.dailyherald.com/article/20151202/news/151209812/.  
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 Jones v. Mun. Employees’ Annuity & Benefit Fund, 50 N.E.3d 596, 596 (Ill. 2016); In re 
Pension Reform Litigation, 32 N.E.3d 1, 1 (Ill. 2015).  
64 In re Pension Reform Litigation, supra note 63, at 11.   
65 Id. at 1-30. See JUDGES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS 12 (2015), https://www.srs.illi 
nois.gov/PDFILES/oldAnnuals/jrs2015.pdf (indicating that the Judges’ Retirement System 
of Illinois had a funding ratio of 35.4% for its pension plan in 2015). 
66 Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 1, https://www.scribd.com/doc 
ument/318846697/Decision-on-redistricting-reform-referendum; see also Kevin Hoffman, Inde-
pendent Map Amendment Loses Round 1, Next Up IL Supreme Court, REBOOT ILLINOIS (July 20, 
2016), http://rebootillinois.com/2016/07/20/independent-map-amendment-loses-round-1-but-ma 
tch-likely-to-be-decided-by-il-supreme-court/61949 (providing analysis of the Hooker decision). 
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cratic judge blocked a petition with 570,000 signatures to allow voters in the 
2016 general election to authorize an independent commission to redraw legisla-
tive maps. The opinion has strong political overtones, even though Circuit Judge 
Diane Larsen is widely respected.67But according to Governor Bruce Rauner,  
a Republican who supports the voter petition, “If this decision remains in place, 
it will prove that we need to put political reform at the top of our legislative 
agenda.”68 The map case is unavoidably political; but the Illinois constitution 
and judiciary would be better served if judges were elected as non-partisan candi-
dates or appointed by a merit commission. This would minimize the appearance 
of political influence in matters of great importance to Illinois voters.69  
 
C. Judicial Conduct Related to Partisan Elections 
 
A recent judicial election in Florida offers a benchmark for measuring 
the low ethics of some Illinois judges. When Lanell Williams-Yulee ran for an 
elected judgeship, she wrote that would she “bring fresh ideas and positive 
solutions to the judicial bench.”70 In the same letter, she added that a “contribu-
tion of $25, $50, $100, $250, or $500, made payable to ‘Lanell Williams–Yulee 
Campaign for County Judge,’ will help raise the initial funds needed to launch 
the campaign and get our message out to the public.”71 The Florida Bar charged 
her with violating its Code of Judicial Conduct, which bans personal solicitations 
for campaign funds.72 Eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Florida did 
not violate the candidate’s First Amendment rights.73 
Illinois greased the way for judges to make unethical campaign state-
ments by misleading the public.74 For context, 112 judges have filed petitions 
																																								 																				
67 See REPORT ON THE JUDGES SEEKING RETENTION ON THE NOVEMBER 2, 2010 BALLOT IN 
COOK COUNTY, JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE COMMISSION OF COOK COUNTY 25 (2010), https:// 
web.archive.org/web/20120130202540/http:/www.voteforjudges.org/JPC_report_for_2010_f
inal.pdf (“Judge Larsen is considered a smart judge who issues timely and well-reasoned 
opinions. She drew praise for her calm, professional manner and her diligence and focus.”). 
68 See Williams, infra note 141, at 1909 (“A multimember court must not have its guarantee 
of neutrality undermined, for the appearance of bias demeans the reputation and integrity not 
just of one jurist, but of the larger institution of which he or she is a part.”). 
69 See SIDE-BY-SIDE TEXT COMPARISON, 2007 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT WITH 
COMPARABLE PROVISIONS OF 1990 CODE, infra note 131 (indicating the judicial standards for 
the appearance of impropriety in both the 1990 and 2007 codes of judicial conduct in Illinois).  
70 Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S.Ct. 1656, 1663 (2015). 
71 Id.  
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
74 People ex rel. Francis X. Golniewicz v. Ill. Court’s Comm’n, No. 05 CH 11679, 2006 WL 
4660087 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Feb. 15, 2006). The petitioner was removed as a Cook County judge 
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for retention elections in November 2016.75 Three judges in St. Clair County who 
are up for retention elections “retired” to refile as new candidates in the general 
election.76 By doing so, they will avoid the sixty percent retention requirement 
and will need to garner only one more vote than their opponents to serve again.77  
Sounding like a smooth talking politician, Judge John Baricevic said 
that running in the general election would “allow[] him to speak out more about 
issues that affect the judiciary,”78 a phrase that is similar to Yulee’s statement 
that had led to her discipline.79 Judge Baricevic failed to mention, however, 
that his devious strategy violated the spirit of the Illinois Constitution, which 
regulates retention elections.80 His less noble intention—not mentioned in his 
appeal to voters—was to game the system in order to survive the next election. 
In his 2010 retention election, Judge Baricevic squeaked by with 62.49% “yes” 
votes—a margin of about two percentage points.81 In the 2016 election, he 
could have polled twelve percentage points less than he did in 2010, and won 
another term on the bench. St. Clair County Judge Lloyd Cueto retired to run 
in the 2006 general election, which he won.82 
These retiring judges might also be angling to double dip—that is, 
receive retirement income while earning income in their “new” job. This rec-
ently happened in New York, where State Supreme Court Justice Brian 
DeJoseph retired on December 31, 2014 and began a new term of office the 
next day.83 His election to a new term exploited a loophole in New York’s 
																																								 																				
after he falsely claimed that he was a lifelong resident of the sub-circuit. Id. The Illinois 
Courts Commission found this to be “a misrepresentation and a violation of Rule 62 of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct which requires judges to conduct themselves ‘in a manner that 
promotes public confidence in the integrity . . . of the judiciary.’” Id. 
75 STATE OF ILL. EXEC. DEP’T, LIST OF JUDGES SEEKING RETENTION IN THE NOVEMBER 8, 
2016 GENERAL ELECTION (2016). 
76 George Pawlaczyk, Who Will Appeals Court Side with in St. Clair County Judges Case? 
BELLEVUE NEWS-DEMOCRAT (June 7, 2016), http://www.bnd.com/news/local/article8233 
8447.html (reporting that three Democratic judges—John Baricevic, Robert Haida and 
Robert LeChien—prevailed in a challenge before the state election board and lower court).  
77 Id. 
78 Id.  
79 Id.; Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665 (2015) (“[Yulee’s] stated 
purpose for the solicitation was to get her ‘message out to the public.’”).  
80 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12. 
81 George Pawlaczyk, Baricevic, Haida and LeChien Spurn Retention Vote, Will Run in 
General Election, BELLEVUE NEWS-DEMOCRAT (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.bnd.com/new 
s/local/article32427582.html.  
82 Id.  
83 Michelle Breidenbach, Judge DeJoseph to Double Dip with Pension and Salary in New 
Term, SYRACUSE.COM (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2015/01 
/judge_dejoseph_double_dips_with_pension_and_salary_in_new_term.html. 
Vol. 2:1]      Open for Business: Illinois Courts and Party Politics 
 
 
199 
retirement law, enabling him to bank an estimated $112,000 a year in pension 
benefits while concurrently earning $183,300 as salary.84 In Pennsylvania, 
eighty-six judges similarly double-dip, having received in 2012, for instance, 
nearly $11 million in combined pension and salary payments.85  
Illinois has a similar problem. Judge Michael McCuskey, now an Illinois 
circuit court judge, took his current post after he retired from his federal 
judgeship.86 Upon retirement, he became eligible by federal law for a full-salary 
pension of $199,100 per year.87 He quickly returned to the bench—simply by 
changing a federal robe for a state robe.88 In Illinois, he earns $190,758.89  
Thus, Judge McCuskey appears to be paid about $389,858 annually from 
his federal pension and state salary. Nothing in the Judicial Code addresses this 
																																								 																				
84 Id.  
85 Robert Swift, Double Dippers: Senior Judges’ Combined Compensation Costs Taxpayers 
Millions, CITIZENS’ VOICE (Oct. 6, 2013), http://citizensvoice.com/news/double-dippers-
senior-judges-combined-compensation-costs-taxpayers-millions-1.1564137. 
86 Less than a month after retiring, Judge McCuskey accepted appointment in Illinois’s Tenth 
Judicial Circuit as Resident Circuit Judge of Marshall County in the 10th Judicial Circuit.  See 
Retired Federal Judge Michael McCuskey Appointed in 10th Judicial Circuit, CINEWSNOW.COM 
(June 16, 2014), http://www.cinewsnow.com/news/local/US-Supreme-Court-fills-vacancy-in-
10th-Judicial-Circuit-263311611.html (indicating that Judge McCuskey retired from the federal 
bench in May of 2014 and confirmed his appointment to the 10th Circuit on June 16, 2014). 
87 See 28 U.S.C. § 371(a)(2) (“In a case in which a justice or judge retires . . . the justice or judge 
shall continue to receive the salary that he or she was receiving when he or she was last in active 
service . . . .”); see also UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL COMPENSATION, http://www.uscourts. 
gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-compensation. Upon reaching age 65, a federal judge may retire 
at his or her current salary, or take senior status, after performing 15 years of active service as an 
Article III judge. Id. According to Judge McCuskey’s biographical information, he was born in 
1948 and served as a federal district court judge from 1998 until he assumed senior status on June 
30, 2013. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL JUDGES: MCCUSKEY, 
MICHAEL PATRICK, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2765. On May 31, 2014, he retired 
from senior status. Id. In 2013, Judge McCuskey would have qualified for $174,000—but by 
staying one additional year on senior status, his pay increased to $199,100. UNITED STATES 
COURTS, JUDICIAL COMPENSATION, supra note 87.  
88 To obtain a copy of Judge McCuskey’s annual filing of economic interests under Rule 68, I 
traveled to the Illinois supreme court in Springfield on July 20, 2016— a distance of about 80 
miles. Per Rule 68, I was required to identify myself, list my address and occupation, and state 
my reason for obtaining this information. After paying 25 cents per page for a copy of the report, 
I verified that he retired as a federal judge and listed this pension on his report (copy available 
upon request from the author). By rule, the Judge was provided a copy of my request. Judge 
McCuskey ran unopposed in the March 2016 primary election for circuit judge. Michael 
McCuskey, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Michael_McCuskey (last visited Nov. 27, 
2016). For a more general discussion on judicial retirement, see generally Stephen B. Burbank et 
al., Leaving the Bench, 1970 –2009: The Choices Federal Judges Make, What Influences Tho-se 
Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (2012).  
89 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 54. 
                                    Journal of Law & Public Affairs                  [June 2017 
 
 
200 
problem, perhaps because drafters never thought that a judge would stoop so 
low. Aggravating this problem, Rule 68 of the Illinois Code creates an infor-
mational obstacle course for anyone who wants to discover if a judge is double 
dipping with a public pension.90 Judge McCuskey’s money grab, facilitated 
and obscured by unnecessary barriers in Rule 68, reduces public confidence in 
Illinois courts. 
 
III. THE INFLUENCE OF ELECTION CAMPAIGNS ON JUDGES 
 
A. Partisan Fundraising and Erosion of Judicial Independence 
 
Illinois has experienced an alarming growth in political fundraising for 
judges, and these campaigns increasingly attract huge donations by anony-
mous, out-of-state donors.91 This spending is out of control for Democratic and 
Republican candidates. On the Republican side, Justice Lloyd Karmeier’s epic 
election in 2004 raised more money than eighteen U.S. Senate elections.92 He 
and his Democratic opponent spent $9.3 million on a supreme court seat for a 
sparsely populated rural district.93  
Why did this race attract so much money? State Farm Insurance Co. 
donated heavily to Justice Karmier at the time it was pursuing an appeal in Avery 
																																								 																				
90 Rule 68 requires judges to make a declaration of economic interests.  See ILLINOIS SUPREME 
COURT RULES, Rule 68 ¶ 4. By administrative order, current economic interests specifically 
include a “pension plan.” Id., at Rule 68, Administrative Order. But the information is not 
available online—indeed, one must personally travel to Springfield or Chicago to inspect the 
filing, and further: “Each person requesting examination of a statement or portion thereof must 
first fill out a form prepared by the Director specifying the statement requested, identifying the 
examiner by name, occupation, address and telephone number, and listing the date of the request 
and the reason for such request.” Id., at Rule 68 ¶ 4; see also supra note 88 (noting that my trip to 
Springfield was necessary to verify Judge McCuskey’s federal judicial pension). 
91 See National Center for State Courts, JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS, http://www. 
judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/campaigns_and_elections/campaign_financing.cfm?state 
(“Between 1990 and 2000, combined spending by supreme court candidates in Illinois increased 
37%, and primary election spending grew by 132%.”); see, e.g., ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF 
ELECTIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS LIST, https://www.elections.il.gov/CampaignDisclosure/Contribut 
ionsSearchByAllContributions.aspx (search with “JUSTPAC” as “Last Name or Only Name” 
and “10/12/2004 Thru 10/13/2004” as “Received Date”) (reporting on contributions made by 
JUSTPAC to Justice Lloyd A. Karmeier in the amount of $150,000 on October 12, 2004 and 
$186,125 on October 13, 2004). 
92 Bert Brandenburg & Roy A. Schotland, Keeping Courts Impartial Amid Changing Judicial 
Elections, DÆDALUS, Fall 2008, at 102, 104, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40544065. 
93 A Vote of Confidence for Supreme Court Justice Lloyd Karmeier, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 27, 2014), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-supreme-appellate-court-endorse-edi 
t-20141027-story.html.  
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v. State Farm.94 The trial court awarded policyholders $1 billion in damages 
for the insurer’s fraudulent use of inferior parts to repair cars.95 After Justice 
Karmeier was elected, he voted to overturn this ruling.  
The 2004 election hounds him today. Recently, a federal judge ordered 
him to sit for a deposition in a RICO lawsuit against State Farm that stems from 
the insurer’s campaign donations.96 In 2014, Justice Karmeier barely survived 
a bitterly contested retention election that attracted more than $2 million to 
attack his record.97 
Justice Karmeier also voted in 2005 to overturn a $10.1 billion judgment 
in Price v. Philip Morris Inc.98 The trial court ruled that the tobacco firm 
fraudulently marketed light cigarettes as a less harmful smoking alternative.99 
The tobacco industry and other business groups donated heavily to Justice 
Karmeier.100 Plaintiffs asked for his recusal but he declined.101 A short time later, 
he voted in the majority to reverse the judgment against Phillip Morris.102 
On the Democratic side, Justice Charles Freeman has been on the 
Illinois supreme court since 1990. In 2002, after his best year for campaign 
donations in 2000, Justice Freeman wrote the court’s opinion in Dillon v. 
																																								 																				
94 James Sample, The Campaign Trail: The True Cost of Expensive Court Seats, SLATE  
(Mar. 6, 2006), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2006/03/the_ 
campaign_trial.html (revealing that Justice Karmeier received over $350,000 in direct 
contributions from State Farms employees, lawyers and others, plus over $1 million more 
from groups to which State Farm contributed). For background information on the Avery 
case, see generally Avery v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005). 
95 Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1999 WL 34978867 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1999) (reporting 
that the jury awarded $243,740,000 in direct damages and $212,440,000 for installation 
damages; and that the court additionally ordered the company to disgorge $130,000,000 for 
the money that the insurer saved by using sub-standard parts and also pay $600,000,000 in 
punitive damages). 
96 Hale v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 2014 WL 6854416 (S.D. Ill. 2014) (alleging 
that State Farm devised a scheme to elect Judge Lloyd Karmeier to the Illinois supreme court 
and conceal its involvement in the financing and management of the campaign so that Justice 
Karmeier could participate in the Avery case). To review the order to depose Justice 
Karmeier, see Hale v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 813709 (S.D. Ill. 2016). 
97 Brian Mackey, Supreme Tort: The Campaign to Fire Justice Lloyd Karmeier, ST. LOUIS 
PUB. RADIO (Feb. 2, 2015), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/supreme-tort-campaign-fire-
justice-lloyd-karmeier#stream/0 (reporting that Justice Karmeier was retained by 2,921 
votes, which accounts for eight-tenths of a percentage point, even though the plaintiff bar 
spent huge sums to defeat Justice Karmeier— for example, Clifford Law Firm in Chicago 
donated $250,000). 
98 Price v. Philip Morris Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2005), at 31-32. 
99 Price v. Philip Morris Inc., 2003 WL 22597608 (Ill. Cir.Ct. 2003), at *4. 
100 Dorothy Samuels, Judges for Sale, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2006), https://nyti.ms/2ltcOPF.  
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
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Evanston Hospital.103 The opinion changed 80 years of precedent by allowing 
Illinois courts to recognize damages for the increased risk of future injury— in 
other words, damages for speculative injuries.104 
In November 2010, Thomas Kilbride, another Democratic justice, was 
at the center of an intense campaign controversy over his then-recent vote with 
the majority in Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hosp.105 By a 4-2 vote, the Illinois 
supreme court struck down a state statute that capped certain non-economic 
damages in medical malpractice cases.106 Up for a retention vote, Justice 
Kilbride received more than $2 million from the state Democratic Party and 
labor unions, while business groups spent $600,000 to oppose him.107 At the 
time, the money spent on this campaign made it the second highest judicial 
retention campaign.108 Justice Kilbride prevailed in a close contest, receiving 
65.88% of his district’s votes— a victory margin of less than six percentage 
points in a race with only one candidate.109 
 
B. State Regulation of Judicial Campaigns 
 
Some judges become entangled in ethics probes over their legal prob-
lems.110 Putting those examples of character flaws aside, I ask here how 
Illinois compares to other states in regulating judicial campaign ethics. There 
is no easy way to quantify an answer, but no Illinois judge has been disci-
plined in the past decade for campaign violations.111  
																																								 																				
103 Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357 (Ill. 2002). 
104 Id. at 503.  
105 Carrie Johnson, No Opponent, But Big Money in Illinois Justice’s Race, NPR SPECIAL 
SERIES ELECTION 2010 (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story 
Id=130810189. See generally Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem. Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010). 
106 Id.  
107 Johnson, supra note 105.   
108 Id.  
109 Thomas Kilbride, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Thomas_Kilbride (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2016).  
110 See Erica Orden & Mike Vilensky, New York Justice Resigns, Pleads Guilty to Receiving 
Bribe, WALL STREET J. (June 29, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/n-y-supreme-court-judge-
pleads-guilty-to-bribery-1467239239 (reporting that New York State Supreme Court Justice John 
Michalek was charged with receiving gifts from a political operative who had an interest in civil 
cases before the judge); Claudia Lauer, Judge Resigns After Accused of Sexual Abuse Over 3 
Decades, CSL.COM (May 9, 2016), https://www.ksl.com/?nid=157&sid=39702533&title=ark 
ansas-judge-resigns-amid-sexual-misconduct-investigation (reporting that Arkansas Cross 
County District Judge Joseph Boeckmann, Jr. resigned amid allegations that he traded sex for 
reduced sentences for defendants). 
111 Some have attempted to measure the impact of campaigns on court rulings. See, e.g., Adam 
Bonica & Michael J. Woodruff, State Supreme Court Ideology And ‘New Style’ Judicial, SSRN 
Vol. 2:1]      Open for Business: Illinois Courts and Party Politics 
 
 
203 
The original source for state judicial codes is the Canons of Judicial 
Ethics, adopted by the American Bar Association in 1924.112 The Illinois Code 
of Judicial Conduct113 was established in 1964 by the Illinois Judicial 
Conference, which used the Canons as its main source.114 A major scandal in 
1969 involving two supreme court justices led to a constitutional overhaul of 
the judiciary.115 As a result, the high court adopted a commission’s recom-
mendations for new conduct rules for judges.116 
In 1972, the American Bar Association replaced its Canons with the 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct.117 The new code provided a more detailed 
set of substantive rules for judicial ethics.118 But Illinois never fully embraced 
the Model Code. This helps to explain why the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board 
rarely deals with complaints about fundraising and campaigning— the state 
lacks appropriate ethics rules.119  
																																								 																				
(Oct. 31, 2012) (measuring the ideology of state supreme court justices by using campaign finance 
records. For the last discipline case in Illinois involving unethical campaigning, see generally 
People ex rel. Francis X. Golniewicz v. Ill. Court’s Comm’n, No. 05 CH 11679, 2006 WL 
4660087 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Feb. 15, 2006). 
112 Brief of Amicus Curiae Conference of Chief Justices in Support of Respondent, at 8, Williams-
Yulee v. The Florida Bar 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) (No. 13-1499), 2014 WL 7366052, at *8.  
113 See generally CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1986), https://www.illinois.gov/jib/ 
Documents/CODE%20OF%20JUDICIAL%20CONDUCT.pdf. 
114 Robert G. Underwood, The Illinois Judicial System, 47 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247, 260 
(1971-1972). 
115 See Rubin Cohn, The Illinois Judicial Department— Changes Effected by the Constitution of 
1970, 1971 ILL. L. F. 355, 380-82 (1971) (detailing Sherman Skolnik’s successful efforts to force 
two Illinois supreme court justices to resign after they accepted stock in a Chicago bank from a 
defendant whose case they were to decide— and for whom they ruled favorably). For more 
details, see THE SPECIAL COMMISSION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS, IN THE MATTER OF 
THE SPECIAL COMMISSION IN RELATION TO NO. 39797 (PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 
APPELLANT V. THEODORE J. ISAACS ET AL), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/manaster/commission 
report.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) (“The Commission finds that [this Judge] has consistently 
engaged in a pattern of behavior that violated the judicial canons, demeaned the integrity of the 
judiciary, and brought the judicial office into disrepute . . . The Commission finds that the only 
appropriate remedy in this case is to remove and dismiss respondent from the office of Circuit 
Court Judge . . . ..”) and Kenneth A. Manaster, ILLINOIS JUSTICE: THE SCANDAL OF 1969 AND 
RISE OF JOHN PAUL STEVENS (2001) (analyzing the future U.S. Supreme Court Justice’s 
investigation in this matter).  
116 Cohn, supra note 115, at 375. For more background, see generally W. BRAITHWAITE, 
WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES? (1970); G. FIEDLER, THE ILLINOIS COURTS IN THREE CENTURIES 
1673-1973 (1973); and Frank Greenberg, The Illinois “Two-Tier” Judicial Disciplinary 
System: Five Years and Counting, 54 CHI. KENT L. REV. 69 (1977).  
117 Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 112, at *8.  
118 Id.  
119 STATE OF ILLINOIS JUDICIAL INQUIRY BOARD, SUMMARIES OF COMPLAINTS FILED WITH 
THE COURTS COMMISSION (2016), http://www.illinois.gov/jib/Pages/summariescomplain 
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In particular, the Illinois Code is not equipped to deal with millions of 
dollars that fuel partisan elections. This problem traces to 1986, when Illinois 
belatedly updated its Code by using the ABA Code. Even then, the Illinois 
Judicial Ethics Committee accepted only parts of the Model Code.120 By 1994, 
a study of Illinois courts voiced concern about the rapid growth in campaign 
funding for some elections and suggested monitoring for future funding 
practices.121 But no revisions address this concern— indeed, 1994 was the last 
time Illinois revised its Canon for “Inappropriate Political Activity.”122 Since 
then, campaign donations to judicial candidates have exploded exponentially. 
																																								 																				
ts.aspx. These cases include 15 CC-1 Filed February 6, 2015, Beatriz Santiago, Circuit Judge, 
Circuit Court of Cook County (related to refinancing of her mortgage); 14 CC-2, Filed July 
24, 2014, Scott D. Drazewski, Circuit Judge, 11th Circuit, McLean County and Rebecca S. 
Foley, Circuit Judge, 11th Circuit, McLean County (related to their extramarital affair); 14 
CC-1 Filed June 20, 2014, Joseph P. Hettel, Circuit Judge, 13th Circuit, LaSalle County 
(based on driving under the influence of alcohol); 13 CC-1 Filed August 13, 2013, Cynthia 
Y. Brim, Circuit Judge, Circuit Court of Cook County (based on inappropriate comments 
and battery in court); 12 CC-1 Filed July 13, 2012, Joseph C. Polito, Associate Judge, 12th 
Circuit, Will County (based on use of work computer to access pornographic websites during 
work hours in chambers); 11 CC-1 Filed February 18, 2011, Douglas J. Simpson, Associate 
Judge, Circuit Court of Cook County (based on improper influence of another judge in a 
matter involving auto shop where his car was being serviced); 10 CC-2 Filed November 8, 
2010, Christopher G. Perrin, Associate Judge, 7th Circuit, Sangamon County (based on 
improper influence of another judge in a case involving daughter’s traffic citation); and 2010 
CC-1 Filed September 24, 2010, Kenneth L. Popejoy, Circuit Judge, 18th Circuit, DuPage 
County (related to car accident and unsafe driving). Id. 
120 Andy Knott, A New Code for Illinois Judges, 1 CBA RECORD 11 (1987); CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT: ANNOTATED BY OPINIONS OF THE ILLINOIS JUDICIAL ETHICS COMM-
ITTEE, COMMITTEE COMMENTARY 2, http://ija.org/ethicsop/annotation%20of%20Code%20 
of%20Judicial%20Conduct.pdf.  
 
It was . . . not feasible to recommend that the ABA canons be adopted 
verbatim. Specific provisions of the Illinois Constitution and statutes as well 
as circumstances unique to Illinois required that the canons be modified in 
accord with any superseding legal requirements and extraordinary circum-
stances. The committee commentary is primarily concerned with these 
modifications; however, wherever appropriate, the ABA commentary has 
been incorporated into the committee commentary. 
 
Id. 
121 Marlene Arnold Nicholson & Norman Nicholson, Funding Judicial Campaigns in 
Illinois, 77 JUDICATURE 294, 299 (1994). 
122 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 113. Rule 67- Canon 7, titled “A Judge or Judicial 
Candidate Shall Refrain from Inappropriate Political Activity,” was adopted Dec. 2, 1986 (eff. 
Jan. 1, 1987); amended April 20, 1987 (eff. Aug. 1, 1987); and amended Aug. 6, 1993 (eff. Mar. 
24, 1994). Id. The Illinois Code has not changed over the past 22 years while judicial elections 
have exploded with multi-million dollar, nationally-financed campaigns. Id.  
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Serious problems with the state’s Judicial Inquiry Board magnify the 
Code’s deficiencies.123 A recent audit of that agency’s disciplinary system 
found the board operated for 811 days and 1,360 days without filling two 
constitutionally required positions for non-lawyers.124 Overall, it had four 
vacancies in thirteen positions.125 The board had 311 pending complaints, some 
for judicial misconduct and mental incapacity.126 From 2012-2014, the board 
operated with two investigators, and one person who doubled as its executive 
director and general counsel.127 Another analysis showed that the board’s 
budget fell 15%, from $785,000 in 2009 to $680,000 in 2015.128 Before its 
budget was cut, this tiny agency had six or seven employees to investigate 
complaints against judges.129 Now, it imposes discipline in less than one per-
cent of complaints.130 
This means that Illinois judges are not subject to increased scrutiny 
provided by the revised Model Code — and they are also immune from 
discipline due to a grossly ineffectual investigatory board. A direct comparison 
shows that the ABA Code is much more stringent than the Illinois Code in 
promoting public confidence in judges.131 States with stricter codes have won 
																																								 																				
123 STATE OF ILLINOIS JUDICIAL INQUIRY BOARD, COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION 13 (June 30, 
2014), http://www.auditor.illinois.gov/audit-reports/Compliance-Agency-List/JIB/FY14-JI 
B-Comp-Full.pdf. 
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 1.  
126 Id. at 10. 
127 Id. at 27. 
128 Emily Hoerner & Zoe Rosenbaum, In Illinois, Punishment is Slow and Lenient for Errant 
Judges, INJUSTICEWATCH (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.injusticewatch.org/projects/2015/illi 
nois-court-commission-judge-punishment/.  
129 See STATE OF ILLINOIS JUDICIAL INQUIRY BOARD, COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION, supra 
note 123 (exposing serious problems in enforcing judicial ethics). Due to board vacancies 
and underfunding, the Judicial Inquiry Board had “an inventory of 311 pending complaints,” 
including “a growing inventory level of pending complaints concerning alleged misconduct 
or physical or mental incapacity of judicial officers.” Id. at 10. The Board operated for 811 
days and 1,360 days without filling constitutionally mandated board positions for non-
lawyers. Id. at 13. From 2012-2014, the board operated with two investigators, and one 
person who served as its executive director and general counsel. Id. at 27. 
130 Hoerner & Rosenbaum, supra note 128. 
131 Compare American Bar Ass’n, SIDE-BY-SIDE TEXT COMPARISON: 2007 MODEL CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT WITH COMPARABLE PROVISIONS OF 1990 CODE, http://www.americanba 
r.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/new_old.authcheckdam.pdf (“Rule 1.2, Canon 2, 
Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary: A judge shall act at all times in a manner that 
promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, 
and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of Impropriety.”) with CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT, supra note 113, Rule 62, Canon 2 (“A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the 
Appearance of Impropriety in All of the Judge’s Activities . . . A judge should respect and 
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numerous federal court rulings that uphold judicial boards that enforce tight 
controls on judicial campaigning.132 In state court rulings, too, ethics boards 
have won enforcement cases involving limits on judicial campaigning.133 
During this recent period, however, Illinois’ ethics board has been mute in 
these matters. 
																																								 																				
comply with the law and should conduct himself or herself at all times in a manner that 
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”). The ABA 
Code uses the mandatory “shall” while Illinois, by stating “should,” deprives its Code of 
sharp teeth for enforcement. Id. Nothing in the Illinois Code mentions the need for 
independence of the courts— a serious omission in a climate of campaigns financed by 
special interest groups. Id. The ABA Code, in contrast, strictly enjoins judges to maintain 
their independence. Id. 
132 See, e.g., Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that 
Arizona’s code restrictions on judicial endorsement and campaigning were narrowly tailored 
to achieve Arizona’s compelling interest); Platt v. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievs. & Discipline 
of Ohio Supreme Court, 769 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2014) (upholding Ohio Code of Judicial 
Conduct restrictions on personal and direct solicitation of campaign funds); Wersal v. 
Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2012) (upholding campaign restrictions imposed on 
judges and judicial candidates by the Minnesota Board of Judicial Standards); Siefert v. 
Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 983-88 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding Wisconsin regulations that 
prohibit judges and judicial candidates from personally soliciting or accepting campaign 
contributions); Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding regulations 
by Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications (ICJQ) and the Indiana Disciplinary 
Commission (IDC) that limit the political activities of judges). But see, e.g., Sanders County 
Republican Cent. Committee v. Bullock, 698 F.3d 741, 744 (9th Cir. 2012) (striking down a 
Montana law that criminalized a political party’s endorsement of judicial candidates as a 
violation of the First Amendment).  
133 See, e.g., Winter v. Wolnitzek, 482 S.W.3d 768, 770-76 (Ky. 2016) (ruling that judicial 
candidate violated state ethics law based on his disingenuous campaign statement); Miss. 
Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Clinkscales, 192 So.3d 997, 998 (Miss. 2016) 
(upholding fine and admonishment of a judge for ethical breaches, including posting a 
campaign endorsement on social media); In re Belk, 691 S.E.2d 685, 686 (N.C. 2010) 
(removing judge from office for refusing to resign from board of private corporation); In re 
Krause, 141 So.3d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 2014) (upholding $25,000 fine for judge who purchased 
a table at a Republican Party fundraiser with funds from her campaign); In re Judicial 
Complaint Against Stormer, 980 N.E.2d 1045 (upholding $1,000 fine against judicial 
candidate for participating in, or receiving campaign contributions, during a judicial 
campaign fundraising event that identified donors by the amount of their contributions); In 
re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Moll, 935 N.E.2d 436, 437 (2012) (upholding 
$1,000 fine against judge whose campaign flyer made knowingly and recklessly misleading 
statements); In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Lilly, 965 N.E.2d 315, 315 
(upholding fine against non-judge candidate for judicial office whose campaign literature 
misrepresented her identity by portraying her in judicial robe and bearing the word, “re-
elect”). But see In re Slaughter, 480 S.W.3d 842, 844 (Tex. 2015) (overruling a sanction 
applied to a judge for her Facebook posts on criminal cases in her court). 
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C. U.S. Supreme Court Regulation of Judicial Campaigns 
 
The recent growth in ethics cases involving judicial campaigning 
signifies a larger problem: more judges feel free to make political statements 
in ways that compromise their impartiality. The problem starts at the top, where 
Justice Scalia, Justice Alito, and Justice Ginsburg have tarnished the Supreme 
Court’s reputation by engaging in openly partisan politics.134 In state courts— 
where 90 percent of all cases are filed135— this problem has more potential to 
undermine justice.136  
																																								 																				
134 See Jilian Fama & Meghan Kiesel, Scalia’s Two Cents: Justice Draws Criticism for 
Political Views in Decisions, ABC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/P 
olitics/OTUS/supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalias-political-outbursts/story?id=16694778 
(reporting on Justice Scalia’s publicly stated opposition to President Obama’s immigration 
policies); Aliyah Frumin, 6 Other Times Justices Came Under Fire for Being too Political, 
NBC NEWS (June 14, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/6-other-timesjustices-
came-under-fire-being-too-political-n609416 (reporting that Justice Alito shook his head and 
mouthed “not true” when President Obama criticized the Court’s ruling that removed spen-
ding caps on corporate campaigns); Michael D. Shear, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Expresses 
Regret for Criticizing Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2ltcdhe 
(reporting on Justice Ginsburg’s strong views that Republican candidate Donald Trump was 
not fit to be president). 
135 See AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIETY FOR LAW & POLICY, 10 QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS ABOUT JUSTICE AT RISK: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 
AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS (Question 10), http://www.acslaw.org/10_Questions_about_Just 
ice_at_Risk.pdf. 
136 Two key examples illustrate the significance of this problem. In 2003, Alabama Chief 
Justice Roy Moore defied an injunction to remove a monument of the Ten Commandments 
from the State Judicial Building. William H. Pryor Jr., Christian Duty and the Rule of Law, 
34 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2003). At the time, Chief Justice Moore argued that he and his 
supporters had a legal and moral duty to God that required disobedience of the injunction. 
Id. More recently, under Chief Justice Moore’s direction the Alabama Supreme Court 
prohibited all probate judges from issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Ex parte 
State ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., 200 So.3d 495, 552 (Ala. 2015). A federal district court judge 
then enjoined the Alabama’s court’s mandamus. Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C, 
2016 WL 3199523, at *3 (S.D. Ala. June 7, 2016). On May 6, 2016, the Alabama Judicial 
Inquiry Commission filed a complaint that charged him with willfully abusing his admin-
istrative authority by refusing to comply with this federal court injunction. Complaint at 26-
32, In re Moore (No. 46) (Ala. Ct. of the Judiciary May 6, 2016). For an explanation of the 
unusual course of pending litigation, see Jacob Gershman, Suspended Alabama Chief Justice 
Roy Moore Denies Going Rogue, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/ 
2016/06/21/suspended-chief-justice-roy-moore-denies-going-rogue/. Appellate Justice Robert 
Steigmann offers an illustration of a different ethics problem in Illinois. In 2016, Justice 
Steigmann donated $1,000 to a Champaign County public defender who challenged an 
incumbent state’s attorney in the judge’s appellate district. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF 
ELECTIONS, https://www.elections.il.gov/campaigndisclosure/A1List.aspx?ID=31722&File 
dDocID=601802&ContributionType=AllTypes&Archived=True. The donation was in 
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Politically active state judges undercut the foundational idea that courts 
must be independent of the political branches. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
begun to address political influence in the judicial system. Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Co. ruled that the West Virginia supreme court denied a plaintiff due 
process when a newly elected justice refused to recuse himself after receiving $3 
million in campaign donations from the defendant.137 In 2015, Williams-Yulee 
v. Florida Bar held that the state did not violate a judicial candidate’s First 
Amendment speech rights after disciplining her for campaign solicitations.138 In 
the most recent term, Williams v. Pennsylvania again confronted a case where a 
judge’s appearance of bias was manifested in his campaigning.139 These cases 
																																								 																				
tension with Illinois Judicial Code: “A judge shall not engage in any political activity except 
(i) as authorized under any other provision of this Code, (ii) on behalf of measures to improve 
the law, the legal system or the administration of justice, or (iii) as expressly authorized by 
law.” CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 113, at Rule 67, Canon 7, Point C. The fact 
that no provision in the Illinois judicial code expressly prohibits this type of donation— that 
is, a campaign preference by a sitting judge for a candidate for prosecutor (who is part of the 
executive branch)— undermines the state constitution’s requirement that judicial power is 
independent of the political branches.  
137 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Co., 556 U.S. 868, 868-70 (2009). A small coal operator won a $50 
million civil judgment against Massey, a larger company. Id. at 872. Massey’s president spent 
more than $3 million to help elect Brent Benjamin as a new justice to West Virginia’s highest 
court. Id. at 884. Justice Benjamin arrived on the court in time to vote to reverse the entire $50 
million judgment. Id. at 886. Caperton appealed to the nation’s high court, arguing that he was 
denied due process. Id. at 873. The Supreme Court ruled for Caperton, concluding that Justice 
Benjamin’s participation presented a “serious risk of actual bias.” Id. at 884. The Court 
elaborated: “Blankenship’s campaign efforts had a significant and disproportionate influence in 
placing Justice Benjamin on the case . . . Blankenship’s campaign contributions—in comparison 
to the total amount contributed to the campaign, as well as the total amount spent in the election—
had a significant and disproportionate influence on the electoral outcome.” Id.  
138 Williams-Yulee, supra note 70. Chief Justice John Roberts explained that “the role of 
judges differs from the role of politicians.” Id. at 1667. He said that judges must strive “to 
be perfectly and completely independent.” Id. at 1666. While subject to intense scrutiny 
because of the First Amendment, Florida’s Judicial Canon outweighed Yulee’s speech rights: 
“Judges, charged with exercising strict neutrality and independence, cannot supplicate 
campaign donors without diminishing public confidence in judicial integrity.” Id.  
139 Williams v. Pennsylvania, __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 1899, 1907 (2016). Ronald Castile, a 
district attorney in Philadelphia, approved a prosecutor’s request in 1984 to seek the death 
penalty against Terrance Williams. Id. at 1903. Thirty years later, after a lower court stayed 
Williams’ execution due to improper conduct by prosecutors, the state appealed to reinstate the 
execution. Id. at 1904. By this time, Castille had been elected as a justice on the Pennsylvania 
supreme court. Id. at 1904-05. After he declined a motion by Williams for recusal on grounds 
of bias, the case went before the U.S. Supreme Court. See generally id. Ruling that Castille’s 
refusal to recuse himself violated Williams’ due process rights, Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
detailed how Castille’s campaign emphasized his role in securing death penalty convictions. 
Id. at 1907-08. The Court dismissed Chief Justice Castille’s defense that he had played only a 
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have the salutary effect of policing against judicial misconduct, but they only 
address a few examples of improper politicking.    
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Political influence in Illinois courts will not subside as long as the 
state’s judicial code aids and abets record levels of campaign spending on 
judicial elections. The following recommendations address the problems 
identified in this study. 
 
1. Illinois should abolish partisan elections for judges.140 The state 
should select and retain judges with a commission of non-
lawyer citizens, lawyers, and judges who use merit criteria. 
This change is needed because political influence pervades 
Illinois courts.  
 
2. Illinois courts will not deserve the confidence of its citizens 
until it updates its judicial code with current provisions of the 
ABA’s Model Code. Judges are currently bound to an ethics 
code that is a relic from the 1970s through early 1990s— a 
period when little money was spent on judicial elections. 
While I find no evidence that judges are corrupt like recent 
																																								 																				
ministerial role in capital sentencing decisions. Id. Castille’s campaign messages included news 
accounts of his statement that he “’sent 45 people to death rows’ as a district attorney.” Id. at 
1907 (citations omitted). More broadly, Williams stated that “the appearance and reality of 
impartial justice are necessary to the public legitimacy of judicial pronouncements and thus to 
the rule of law itself.” Id. at 1909.  
140 My recommendation ignores the compelling points in the “Axiom of 80,” as explained 
by Geyh in supra note 1. 
 
Efforts to address threats to independence that arise in the context of 
selecting judges must take into account four political realities, that together 
constitute what I am calling the “Axiom of 80”: (1) Roughly 80% of the 
public prefers to select its judges by election and does so; (2) Roughly 80% 
of the electorate does not vote in judicial elections; (3) Roughly 80% of 
the electorate cannot identify the candidates for judicial office; and (4) 
Roughly 80% of the public believes that when judges are elected, their 
decisions are influenced by the campaign contributions they receive. 
 
Id. at 47. Prof. Geyh discouragingly concludes that “reformers conceded to the political 
necessity of judicial elections long ago, and now many appear poised to raise the white flag 
on merit selection systems that split the difference between purely appointive models and 
contested elections.” Id. at 49. 
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governors,141 I find substantial evidence of influence peddling 
in judicial elections. Illinois judges should be held to stringent 
campaign standards that are common in other states.  
 
3. Illinois needs a robust board to enforce judicial ethics. Judges 
should be disciplined for donating to candidates who run for 
prosecutor, engaging in retire-to-run shams, and double-
dipping at the expense of taxpayers. Illinois should be more like 
states that discipline judicial candidates for campaign messages 
that degrade the impartiality of the judiciary. These reforms 
cannot be accomplished unless and until Illinois endows its 
judicial ethics board with enhanced powers, provides more 
funding for a proactive enforcement staff, and creates trans-
parent methods to audit and disclose the financial interests of 
judges to the taxpaying public.  
 
For now, Illinois courts are open for business—and open for labor 
unions, open for trial lawyers, open for political parties, and open for special 
interest groups that dole out money from deep campaign chests. 
 
 
																																								 																				
141 In important respects, Illinois leads the nation in political corruption. Four of its last seven 
governors have been sent to prison. Elizabeth Flock, Rod Blogojevich is 4th Illinois Governor 
Jailed in Four Decades, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/blogpost/post/rod-blagojevich-4th-illinois-governor-jailed-in-four-decades/2011/12/0 
8/gIQAFzvVfO_blog.html. A comprehensive study of convictions involving public officials 
from 1976 to 2008 ranked Illinois fourth in the nation for public corruption. Cheol Liu & 
John L. Mikesell, The Impact of Public Officials’ Corruption on the Size and Allocation of 
U.S. State Spending, 74 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 346, 351 (2014). A different nation-wide audit of 
government ethics has low marks for Illinois, giving the state’s judiciary an “F” on several 
objective metrics. Pam G. Dempsey, Illinois Gets D+ Grade in 2015 State Integrity 
Investigation, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.publicintegrity.org/ 
2015/11/09/18382/illinois-gets-d-grade-2015-state-integrity-investigation (citing Illinois’s 
inadequate process for evaluating the performance of judges and the state’s failure to provide 
citizens with access to performance reviews of judges and audit of judges’ asset disclosures).  
